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Attentional bias refers to how a person's perception is affected by selective factors in
their attention (focus). It is defined as the tendency to believe—possibly erroneously—that there
is a relationship (correlation) between two or more variables when instances of both are
simultaneously observed, and that more attention is paid to this condition than when only one of
the variables is present and the other variable is absent.
Attentional biases may explain an individual's failure to consider alternative possibilities
when occupied with an existing train of thought (Baron 2008). It may explain an individual’s
failure to consider other explanatory variables or conditions. The question posed in this thesis is
the role of attentional bias in crisis management, and how its effects can be mitigated. Attention
tension refers to mental or emotional strain in the direction of focus, which typically comes as a
precursor and as it relates to attentional bias.
The literature survey is limited to the past thirty years. Most researchers have focused on
framing crisis management by examining case studies of industrial disasters. These studies are
more descriptive than if they had focused on building organizational theory or focused on
“accidents” instead of crises.
This thesis bridges this gap by shifting from analyzing a crisis constitutionally to an event
that has a certain beginning and end. It analyzes a crisis from a process perspective by focusing
on the human factors that influence crisis management and communication. Several questions
are answered in this paper. One is the frequency in which project leaders take accountability
during the critical incident stress phase of a crisis. The hypothesis is that it is not often. A more
pertinent, second question is how frequently do project leader emotions get put aside for speedy
resolution during the crisis incident stress phase of a crisis? The hypothesis is that it is often.
Third question is whether or not a relationship exists between the stress project leaders face
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during a crisis and how fast they move towards project completion by swiftly making a concrete
crisis management plan? The hypothesis is that there is a statistically relevant relationship. Is
attentional bias common for project leaders during stages of crisis management from the critical
incident stress phase to the management phase? The hypothesis is that it is common. All the
hypothesis are suggested to be true.
When a situation develops into a crisis, pressure becomes intense for the project decision
leader. Crisis theory has evolved from analyzing natural disasters in the 1960s and 1970s to
analyzing complex crisis events such as terrorist attacks, plane crashes, power network outages,
and national economic meltdowns. The ramifications of these crises can be felt for decades.
Proper analysis and quantification of these events are crucial as commerce becomes more
globally interconnected.
Real options and networks adoption will be discussed within the framework of decision-
making under uncertainty during a crisis. The aim of this part of the research is to tackle decision
making and communication by perusing the crisis theory literature and adding crisis management
communication theory. Real options and network solutions will be related and limitations in
current research highlighted. The aim is to propose new approaches and suggest room for
improvements.
The research presented focuses on human factor aspects required for change to transpire
during a crisis trigger event or the critical incident stress phase of the initial onset of a crisis.
More specifically, as crisis management deals with pre-crisis (prevention and preparation), crisis
response, and post-crisis stages; this paper will focus on the first two of these aspects.
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2 Literature review
Benson (1988) was the first to propose a situational approach to crisis management. He
challenged scholars to understand how crisis type influences response strategies. The research
later evolved to classification of different organizational crisis types without providing crisis
solution strategies (Fearn-Banks, 1996; Lerbinger, 1997; Coombs & Sherry 2002).
Crisis clusters or crisis groupings of similar likeness were first proposed by Coombs and
Sherry in 2002 and were divided into three categories of victim, accidental, and preventable. The
prior two indicate the organization is not at fault for the crisis. Either harm is inflicted on the
organization and its stakeholders or accidentally harm occurs from the organization to outside
stakeholders. The latter indicating the organization is at fault when it comes to admitting
culpability or protecting stakeholders.
Crisis management is a specific type of change management meaning the collective term
for approaches to support individuals, teams, and organizations in making organizational change
(e.g. technological evolution, process reviews, crisis). In literature, change management can
relate to structural aspects or human reactions required to plan for or learn from change. Crisis
communication and management after an outbreak or crisis onset will be analyzed at the internal
stakeholder level (hierarchical managerial levels and horizontally across crisis management
teams).
The literature refers to six stages of crisis management: 1) warning, 2) risk assessment, 3)
response, 4) management, 5) resolution, and 6) recovery. The present review focuses on steps
three through five. One parameter for this paper framing the four hypotheses is the speed for
which change (crisis response) takes place. The second parameter is the degree to which a
change transpires. This review focuses on short-term, immediate solutions for crisis management
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resolution, not necessarily meant for implementation into an organization for longer term use
(Boin and Hart, 2003).
Organizational psychology and crisis management literature is used to characterize how
managers and teams perceive new decision-making contexts and what causes a different frame in
managerial attention and tension. The literature has been limited to the past thirty years because
typically researchers have focused on framing a crisis by examining case studies, which are
typically more descriptive than focused on organizational theory, or focusing on “accidents”
instead of crises at large from an organizational perspective.
In a similar, broader field of study, emergency management touches on the interplay
among disaster stakeholders (people with an interest or concern during a given crisis). It largely
concerns relations, information coordination of, and communication between governmental,
private, emergency personnel, and public service organizations (Atkins, 2010; Kapucu, 2006;
Vanderford, 2007) . Public and social media relations and the implications of technological
systems are discussed in relation to inter-organizational networking, but not much emphasis is
given to modes and quality of communication in disaster emergency management unlike crisis
management research (Roux-Dufort, 2007). The information does touch on the recommendations
that information should be distributed or communicated by the subject matter experts within the
field, as that is seen to be the most effective and speedy during the recovery process (Heath,
Jaesub, & Lan, 2009).
Early researchers such as Shrivastava (1993), defined crises as situations that require
urgent decisions and include system restructuring and large impacts that are lasting. He stated
that crises differ from emergencies in terms of time scale because they do not have a set
beginning and end. Crisis effects can be felt years after an actual occurrence has taken place (e.g.
global climate change, finance collapse of the automobile sector in 2009). Typically, a crisis also
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has a concatenation of related events that appear on different time scales. For example, a water
storage chemical eruption may affect IT servers in terms of temperature and rivers running
through a city, but effects on humans in terms of cyber security and biological safety may take a
bit longer to occur.
A crisis can be seen to have a long incubation process that suddenly manifests under the
influence of a trigger event. Supporters of this approach defend the idea that crises develop in
phases: warning signals, acute stage, amplification and resolution (Turner 1976; Fink 1986;
Mitroff and Pearson 1993; Gatot and Jacques, 1999, Roux-Dufort, 2007). More specifically,
crises are frequently compared to upheavals during which organizations lose the ability of
making sense of the critical incident stress phase (Weick, 1993; Roux-Dufort, 2007). Coombs
argued in 2007 that a crisis is an unpredictable event that threatens stakeholder expectations both
internal and external to an organization and can seriously impact an organization’s performance
and generate negative outcomes. Extending the definition from the organizational to community
level, a crisis can be interpreted as a situation when core values or life-sustaining systems of a
community are under threat. In turn, a sense of urgency is induced and considerable uncertainties
regarding the nature of the crisis event and its consequences occur (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, &
Sundelius, 2005, pp. 2–3).
The term crisis has long been used to describe an unexpected event that threatens high-
priority values of an organization, presents a restricted amount of time in which a response can
be made, and is unexpected or unanticipated by the working organization (Hermann 1963). The
term crisis has a special suggestion: that a system has been overwhelmed and outside resources
and external coordination are necessary for effective response and recovery.
There should be a distinction made between crisis management and emergency
management. The latter is the effort to plan and respond to inconvenient events that are termed
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as emergencies and disasters– natural and man made. Crisis management is therefore the
coordination of internal and external resources to a previously unanticipated event, an event
surrounded by new uncertainty. The crisis is unlike any previous event that has transpired. The
public sector typically includes the planning of anticipated events while the private sector
includes unanticipated crisis events. With the world becoming more interconnected, countries
such as America are more vulnerable to unpredictable human crises such as catastrophic human
error, acts of terrorism, and greed (Van Wart & Kapucu, 2011). On the other hand, there are rare
events of a large magnitude, which are extremely rare. Large, intense, dangerous events such as
earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, or others can occur and render emergency systems
inadequate, at least temporarily. Crises result largely from human error and human implications
on speed and recovery.
Crisis management is, “a process designed to prevent or lessen the damage a crisis can
inflict on an organization and its [internal and external] stakeholders” (Coombs 2004). There is
disagreement on the effectiveness of different crisis management response strategies, such as
apology, sympathy, or information (Coombs & Holladay, 2008; DiStaso et al., 2015). Effective
crisis management encapsulates “society's ability to maintain critical social functions, to protect
the life and health of the citizens and to meet the citizens' basic requirements in a variety of stress
situations” (Olsen, Kruke, & Hovden, 2007). Its aim is to be a systematic approach for
understanding and responding to large social problems such as “extraordinary stresses and losses,
interference in complex and mutual dependent systems, or lack of trust in vital social
institutions” (Coombs 2002; Coombs 2004; Olsen, Kruke, & Hovden, 2007). Future crisis
infrastructure threats are not limited to specific areas, but stem from convoluted exchanges
between economic, technological, social, and cultural factors. The main challenge to overcome
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them will be the ability to organize and assign clear roles to different stakeholders at the
international, national and local levels (Olsen, Kruke, & Hovden, 2007).
Crisis management as defined later by Van Wart & Kapucu in (2011), digs a bit deeper
defining it as a special type of change management characterized by surprise or uncertainty in
planning contexts due to unexpectedness or size of an incidence, short time frame, organizational
threat, and criticality in terms of life-and-death consequences or organizational threat. Crisis
refers to an organization being significantly damaged or being unable to respond effectively.
During the crisis management process, decision leaders are surrounded by high levels of
uncertainties and are characteristically unsure of what the steps will be to resolve the main
issue(s). This distinguishes them from complex emergencies where past emergencies dictate
future resolutions (e.g. fires, explosions). Typically, past experience provides little guidance to
key project leaders as often in foresight different organizations aren’t aware of which
departments or individuals may be their partners for crisis resolution.
For effective crisis management, a crisis frame must first be identified. According to
Coombs 2004 this is a two-step process. First, the crisis team needs to identify the crisis type. A
crisis type is a “frame used to guide interpretations of the situation” (Coombs 2002; Coombs
2019). Crisis frames or types vary by the degree of crisis responsibility that is attributed to a
given organization that is in question. This is identified as an order of magnitude not just by
confirmation or not (Coombs, 2004). Based on literature, overall, there isn’t just one manner of
crisis management and that the proper form takes into account and depends on the environment
as well as the crisis management team’s emotional standing and concentration.
A crisis has three dimensions: political, functional, and time. A crisis can lie between
vertical and or horizontal cross political boundaries, which would in theory make management
and dissipation more difficult (Chisholm, 1989). The crisis can jump functionally from for
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example privately being a water pollution crisis at a university to becoming public if the
resolution is not handled at an adequate time frame. Another example is a cyber-attack going
from a private space of being handled to the public being made aware of it through media
channels. When crises jump functionally it proves to be difficult to resolve them swiftly because
each sector has more than likely different operations and finances set up. Multiple infrastructure
disasters have similar characteristics in that “they affect multiple jurisdictions, undermine the
functioning of various policy sectors, escalate rapidly, morph along the way” and require rapid
response under conditions of uncertainty (Ansell, Boin, & Keller). For time, a crisis has a
definite beginning and end, but swift resolution is sometimes not feasible.
Trust is seen as the base pillar by many researchers such as Patrick Lencioni (2002) in
organizational psychology when an institution is functioning during normal periods. To diminish
stress levels and improve and reduce team dysfunctions a team within an organization must
establish an air of trust, which then theoretically progressively leads to productive conflict,
commitment to solution creation by involved members, and finally group accountability and
productive results. As seen in communication crisis management cycles of escalation, rigidity,
and distrust impair the development of feasible solutions. The natural tendencies to turn to
threat-rigidity and escalation cycles must be combated. Threat-rigidity meaning escalation tactics
with competing interests during internal crisis communications between departments or
infrastructure sectors may lead psychologically to a “fight or flight” response during the high
stress situations. This can lead to impaired cognitive abilities for creative problem solving
(Stubbart, 1987). Coercion or forcing techniques are as a result attempted, which are
counterproductive as well to crisis management, negotiation, and solution generation (Holmes &
Fletcher-Bergland, 1995).
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2.1 Barriers to crisis management
A good portion of crises result from human error. Research shows that as much 80% of
airplane accidents are due to human error (pilots, air traffic controllers, mechanics) (Van Wart &
Kapucu, 2011). There have been devastating human error accidents, which are a portion of crises
in the past three decades that were technologically related, with human errors at the source. The
1986 Chernobyl catastrophe, the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, the 2014 Heartbleed security bug
in OpenSSL cryptography are a few (Van Wart & Kapucu, 2011).
It should be noted that the flexibility and waiting for information communication
approaches can both be costly in terms of operating costs initially during crisis management. It is
postulated that if more information is gathered and by focusing on one variable at a time versus
multiple at once, an organization or crisis decision leaders can utilize resources more effectively
and efficiently. This is in terms of time management and therefore can resolve a crisis possibly in
a shorter amount of time (Bennet & Driouchi, 2012). Taking from research on a national level
based on case studies, in a cross-boundary, interjurisdictional, multi-infrastructure crisis,
distributed sense making through communication, networked coordination, surge capacity, and
formal scaling procedures are crucial.
During a crisis, project decision leaders are surrounded by uncertainties and are
characteristically unsure of what the steps will be to resolve the main issue(s). This distinguishes
crises from complex emergencies where past emergencies dictate future resolutions (e.g. fires,
explosions). During a crisis, past experience provides little or no guidance to key decision
players as often in foresight different organizations aren’t aware of which departments or
individuals may be their partners for crisis resolution. The common denominator between all
crises regardless of size is that judgment becomes crucial (Topper & Lagadec, 2013).
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Psychologists have argued that anxious individuals, which tend to be project decision
leaders going through the critical incidence stress phase of a crisis first tend to prioritize threat
stimuli during early information processing and direct their attention away from threats in more
strategic stages of processing. This is during response, management, and resolution part of crisis.
This correlates with the vigilance-avoidance pattern, which is when one initially directs attention
to threat or crisis in this case, however, then proceeds to avoid processing details and information
in order to avoid an anxious state of mind.
In essence, attentional bias is the human brain’s cognitive bias that causes an individual
in a state of anxiousness to avoid information at first. Then when attempting to analyze an
overwhelming amount of information, an attempt to analyze multiple variables at once in attempt
to find a pattern or relation transpires.
2.2 Traits that influence a crisis
Thompson 1967 stated that trust, communication, and speed are crucial factors in
attempting to create swift resolutions. He defines mutual adaptation as when multiple sectors
have to respond in real time to a complex crisis that involves multiple individuals or
organizations.
Analytically, the crisis management and communication literature reviews how to create
reliable performance for individuals during normal operations, but barely touches on factors that
produce reliable performance across a network of individuals. This is because most organizations
are unaware of which individuals may be their partners in a multilevel or cross boundary crisis. It
is not discussed how trust is difficult to initially build during the onset of a trigger event when a
crisis management team is being formed or assigned.
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Communication among a network of individuals that is rallied for creating a swift crisis
management solution for the first time will be strained or at best difficult to manage. This is even
if an individual had experience in other crises, since a crisis is marked by an event that is unlike
any other. Colocation could potentially make the management task easier, but within larger
organizations the crisis management team typically is not sitting within the same department or
office. Speed is another obstacle to crisis resolution during most crises. Even within a single
organization there is an endless stream of information.
Technological management systems are typically employed when companies go through
a ‘sudden’ financial crisis before other organizational sections are affected. Tensions within the
organization across managerial lines appear because systems focus on needs of the whole
company versus focusing on different levels of the company.
The barriers to crisis communication appear to be (1) late ‘elucidation’ of the crisis until
a major financial burden or change is felt and a form of ignorance across project leader lines, and
to the team assigned at the onset of a crisis trigger event. (2) The high uncertainty and ambiguity
which always surround the critical incident of a crisis and influence communication and
resolution. It is in this manner and topic during the crisis management process that the project
decision leaders and team assigned surface the need to decipher the meaning, messages, and root
cause behind the crisis events. This in order to move past rigidity and move into crisis
competencies previously mentioned such as flexibility and speedy decision making when
appropriate.
2.3 Competencies in Project Decision Leaders during Stress Phase
Specific traits are needed in internal stakeholder project leaders to aid swift crisis
resolution. In the literature, traits that aid decision leaders or managers in leadership positions
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during off crisis managing include decisiveness, resiliency, energy, willingness to assume
responsibility, personal integrity, and emotional maturity. Communication skills have been
mentioned, along with the ability to influence and negotiate, technical competence, analytical
aptitude, and the eagerness for continual learning. Task-oriented behaviors such as problem
solving, informing, delegating, monitoring and assessing work, and operations planning are also
critical. People-oriented behaviors such as consulting coworkers, planning and organizing
personnel, motivating, and team building are important to create speedy resolutions to steer the
organization as a whole away from fear, frustration, and anxiety emotions during a major cross-
boundary crisis, effectively steering away the crisis management team away from attentional bias.
In contrast, Van Wart and Kapucu (2011) frame crisis resolution competencies as change
management skills that come up during crises. It was postulated by Kapucu in 2006 that traits
like flexibility, communication, motivating, decision making, problem solving, and vision
articulation appear during a crisis. It was also postulated that during a crisis, flexibility like
behavior would arise to produce creative solutions. It was postulated that some transformational
leadership traits would coincide with a crisis situation, but that they would largely differ.
Similarities hypothesized were decisiveness, analytic ability, and self-confidence.
It should be noted that if threat-rigidity occurs in behavior and high-anxiety or high-
defensiveness are triggered, much of higher cognitive functioning (aforementioned positive
behaviors) that need to be gathered during a crisis will not function to the highest degree possible
(Eysenck 2000; Van Wart & Kapucu, 2011).
Willingness to accept responsibility came up as the most frequently mentioned
competency that was necessary in crisis resolution situations. Similarly, another real project
leader stated that not all crisis leaders “are able or willing to adopt this proactive mindset [and] to
adapt protocols on the spot... In a catastrophic event, some will seek or emerge to take on greater
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responsibility, others will step-up if encouraged and guided, and only a few will resist” (Van
Wart & Kapucu, 2011). This further supports the hypothesis that anxiety and fear tends to be the
initial or natural response by some leaders in crisis scenarios at their onset. Challenges of rising
to the occasion, sometimes too many fearing losing their job (Van Wart & Kapucu, 2011).
Additionally, managers surveyed by the authors made comments about stress tolerance such as
“catastrophic events require greater ability to work under stress,” something much supported in
the crisis management literature (Janis 1989; Edwards and Goodrich 2007; and Sylves 2008).
Flexibility and decisiveness along with willingness to assume responsibility came up as
the top three competencies in respective order in emergency or disaster management according
to experienced managers, which should translate to crisis management scenarios as well.
Flexibility in mindset of the crisis leaders serve as solutions to the onset of crises. One
experienced manager stated that ‘leaders involved need to have a strong resiliency to recover
from change. Many fall away from the overwhelming effects of a catastrophic event’ (Van Wart
& Kapucu, 2011). There are three primary responsibilities in a crisis. One being the need for
calm, but ‘strong’ leadership according to literature. More specifically, crisis management
leaders must exhibit self-confidence externally and have the resilience to cope with the trauma
and exhaustion that normally accompanies prolonged events (Van Wart & Kapucu, 2011).
Another second key responsibility that crisis leaders and decision makers need to have is the
ability to make accurate decisions under severe resource and time constraints. This naturally
correlates to the internal struggle created by the stressful uncertain conditions surrounding a
crisis.
To explore the difference in attention and mindset between top decision leaders and line
managers, a crisis aspect framework was proposed by Shrivastava in 1993, which consists of the
4Cs (causes, consequences, caution, and coping). “Causes” focuses on managerial attention that
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stems from immediate failures that caused the crisis and the conditions which allowed for the
failure to transpire. “Consequences” focuses on immediate and more long-term impacts of
various issues and answers surrounding the crisis (e.g. damages). “Caution” measures what is
needed to minimize the impact of a potential crisis, which most prescriptive crisis studies focus
on, and lastly. “Coping” includes measures taken to respond to a crisis that has already occurred
(e.g. management techniques). The 4C framework is interesting and applicable because it
touches on the similarities and differences between top executives and line managers (i.e., crisis
decision leaders and crisis team) in terms of the degree and direction of their attention when a
critical incident stress phase of a crisis transpires.
Gladwin and Kumar (1987) proposed that during a crisis, communication typically is
surrounded by an air of distrust and defensiveness, which may impair stakeholder abilities to
adapt or adjust to each other’s actions. The crisis communication problem solving therefore takes
longer than needed. The threat-rigidity response tends to lead to control centralization of the
crisis versus creation of open collaborative communication, which would theoretically speed up
crisis resolution. Distrust and blame tend to breed a lack of empathy between involved project
decision leaders and hence more crisis management issues. The initial response of project leaders
involved is to restrict information gathering and analysis, which becomes counterproductive to
cooperative problem solving.
Focusing on enhancing top down communications during a crisis, operator decision
making at the bottom of the managerial spectrum and vice versa can be more streamlined. This is
because each organizational level has taken the time to gather information either internally
within a team or externally to make sure that a crisis can’t be solved on a certain level before
escalating an issue. The question becomes do teams typically move in shorter periods of time to
resolve a crisis with minimal information or do they wait and gather facts over a certain amount
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of time before taking action? Which is more effective in reality? The procedures either way
during a crisis should at the least be unique to each organization, if not specific to internal teams
on each level of an organization (e.g. C-suite, managers, operators). Information sharing should
be subject to a system of real options analysis or game theory that is specific to organizational
procedures (Helfat and Raubitschek 2000; Miller and Shapira 2004). This in turn implies that
managerial and organizational structure play crucial parts in crisis resolution through
communication during the critical incidence phase of a crisis. A crucial piece to consider is
uncertainty modeling in the face of a crisis (Borison 2005; Miller and Shapira 2004), but will not
be discussed in this literature review. Decision making in relation debiasing attentional bias will
be across the organizational spectrum. The key point will be an organization’s ability to harness
information to create flexibility, so that resources can be sequenced, staged, or reversed easily in
times of high uncertainty (Bennet & Driouchi, 2012; Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe 2017).
Research shows that when top decision leaders pay attention to internal information
during a crisis, they are more likely to survive than ones that focus on external information or
factors. Attention direction and communication methods employed need to be monitored at the
beginning of a crisis because they set the tone and trajectory of the crisis solution. Imposing too
many stipulations in terms of organizational controls may restrict flexibility and agility (Bogsnes,
2009; Bhimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007). Vertical communication in a hierarchical
organization, even though formal under normal proceedings, under a crisis, information sharing
needs to increase in speed and flexibility on a local and interorganizational level, but that can
prove problematic and difficult to merge (Bogsnes, 2009; Meer-Kooistra and Scapens, 2008;
Bhimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007; Frow et al., 2005). With a strong hierarchy, typically
operators and lower managers find it difficult to bypass formal control lines and at the same time
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remain flexible during a crisis (as can be seen by the aforementioned TeleCo descriptive case
study).
The literature suggests that by decoupling or loosely coupling attention from formal
authority controls may enhance communication channels (Nyland and Pettersen, 1996; Høgheim
et al., 1989; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The theoretical result being information on various levels
of an organization architecture acquiring different intelligence, which later needs to be
deciphered into useful and unuseful data. This is especially to be expected during a crisis
(Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2017).
2.4 Crisis communication theories
Various crisis communication theories exist. Two main ones are image repair theory (IRT)
and situational crisis communication theory (SCCT).
2.4.1 Image repair theory
IRT assumes that organizational “image” (e.g. internal stakeholders) is seen as an asset
and the organization aims to protect it during crisis situations. It assumes that the organization
will take responsibility and attempt in any way to repair the standing image. Benoit later
introduced fourteen specific response strategies that the accused organization could utilize during
a crisis, but that will not be discussed within this paper. Timothy Coombs started working on
SCCT in 1995. Originating from attribution theory, SCCT assumes that crises are negative
events and that stakeholders attempt to attribute responsibility. Coombs believes crisis managers
can employ different crisis strategies according to different crisis types through strategic
planning prior to a crisis occurring in reality. “Severity and performance history have proven to
modify perceptions of crisis responsibility for some crisis types” (Coombs, 1998; Coombs &
Holladay, 1996, 2001). Coombs and the part of SCCT theory suggests that initial assessments of
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crisis responsibility are based on crisis type and should be adjusted depending on severity in
correlation to performance history.
2.4.2 Situational crisis communication theory
A critical part of SCCT according to Coombs 1998 is the relationship between crisis
responsibility and organizational reputation. The objective of the SCCT is to evaluate the
attributions of individual control or the organization’s ability to control the event. Crisis
responsibility takes on a central focus. Perceptions of crisis responsibility have proven to
increase as attributions of personal control intensify. In fact, personal control and crisis
responsibility may be so highly correlated as to merit treating them as essentially the same. The
crisis response strategies should then lessen reputational damage by demonstrating that the
organization genuinely cares for the victims and knows how to behave, therefore meeting public
expectations (Coombs & Sherry, 2002).
The defensive-accommodative continuum is adapted from the work of McLauglin, Cody,
and O’Hair (1983) who used the continuum to explain what people offer for their negative
behavior. This framework should be applied first to the attention spectrum that surrounds a crisis
namely from ignoring to defensive to speculative to collaborative. Then the crisis overall
response strategies and the same spectrum can be applied. Crisis attention, division, tension, and
bias should first be addressed when attempting to come up with crisis solutions or mitigation
(Coombs & Sherry, 2002). Coombs (1998-2011) suggests that crisis leaders utilize progressively
more ‘accommodative strategies’ as crisis responsibility increases, because perception of crisis
responsibility is believed to be directly correlated to reputational damage.
According to Coombs (1995), “crisis attributions do matter as they shape feelings and
behaviors toward the organization involved in the crisis.” People commonly use three causal
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dimensions when making attributions: stability, external control, and personal control/locus.
Stability reflects whether the cause of the event happens frequently or infrequently.
Organizational crisis responsibility should be perceived as strongest when the cause is stable (the
organization has a history of crises), external control is low (controlled by others outside of the
organization), and personal control/locus is internal (the crisis originates from within the
organization). When a crisis event is repeated, the public should be more likely to attribute
responsibility to the organization. Attributions that entail an internal locus/ personal control
suggest that the organization could have done something to prevent the crisis. Coombs for SCCT
argues that information about past crises is a significant factor that can affect perceptions of a
more recent crises.
It is assumed that if a crisis is attributed to an organization that the organization will do
everything in its power to solve the crisis as soon as possible because they have a duty to the
public but more importantly realize that the longer the crisis persists the more resources and
capital it will demand (Coombs, 2004). Coombs and other crisis experts believe that specific
action plans or crisis management strategies can result from similar types of crisis clusters when
identified (Coombs, 1995, 1998, 1999; Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Coombs proposes to create
crisis plans in response to a given crisis, proposing to keep those crisis clusters in mind (victim,
accidental, preventable) and proactively, prior to a crisis happening create potential crises
management and response strategies.
What defines and separates SCCT from data is that external stakeholders need and want
to know once a crisis hits. SCCT focuses on whether or not a company caused or created
dysfunctional equipment by accident. Basic information on what happened needs to be addressed
as well. Protection needs to be put in place for stakeholders involved and corrections must be
made. The crucial point of mentioning instructing information is that a crisis manager or
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response team in the beginning of a crisis may not know what information to take in or reveal to
internal and or external stakeholders. This causes tension or in other words friction and strain.
The relevance of high uncertainty and attention tension and attentional bias due to a crisis within
an at fault organization must be discussed, which Coombs neglects to do in his research.
Coombs focuses on an organization’s reputation and the effects the crisis has on it
relating to three crisis response strategies, which he states are deny, diminish, and deal. An
organization in response to a crisis can deny there is a crisis, diminish or lessen the negative
attributes of the crisis, or deal within head on and work to produce a solution. This paper focuses
on an accepted infrastructure crisis and frames potential manners on how an organization begins
to or should respond internally. Management of an organization uses strategies to protect its
reputation and works to rebuild legitimacy with external stakeholders during a crisis (Coombs
and Holladay, 1996).
Trust is seen as the base pillar by many researchers such as Patrick Lencioni (2002) in
when an institution is functioning during normal periods. To diminish stress levels and improve
and reduce team dysfunctions a team within an organization must establish an air of trust. This
then theoretically progressively leads to productive conflict, commitment to solution creation by
involved members, and finally group accountability and productive results. As seen in
communication crisis management cycles of escalation, rigidity, and distrust impair the
development of feasible solutions. The natural tendencies to turn to threat-rigidity and escalation
cycles must be combated. Threat-rigidity meaning escalation tactics with competing interests
during internal crisis communications between say departments or infrastructure sectors may
lead psychologically to a “fight or flight” response during the high stress situations, which can
lead to impaired cognitive abilities for creative problem solving (Stubbart, 1987). Coercion or
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forcing techniques are as a result attempted, which are counterproductive to crisis management,
negotiation, and solution generation (Holmes & Fletcher-Bergland, 1995).
2.4.3 Typology for crisis communication: resilience-oriented communication
The difference between inner corporate crisis management decision making versus
communication to the public has to be distinguished. Olsson (2014) proposes a two-dimensional
typology for crisis communication. The first dimension concerning operational and strategic
communication. Operational communication focuses on the critical incident stress phase of crisis
and how to best provide direct communication with stakeholders involved and the public. It
traditionally focuses on the distribution of relevant information about a crisis to those most
affected in order for informed decision making to occur. As well, on pertinent, comprehensive
information and emotional reactions instead of organizational survival or recovery. Strategic
information communication on the other hand is often planned and aimed at achieving longer
term organizational goals, influencing or cultivating positive perceptions among stakeholders,
which will not be focused on in this paper (Olsson, 2014).
The second dimension focuses on the aims of reputation-oriented and resilience-oriented
communication. Reputation-oriented communication, which is organization centered being
sender-oriented communication, which aims to manage organization reputation aspects. Its
purpose is to promote an organization’s preferences and so it strengthens its legitimacy and
credibility. The organization’s reputation relates to internal stakeholder perceptions of the firm in
its ability to produce services and its associated perceived quality. The organization’s standing in
terms of prominence in the minds of stakeholders is also connected to collective recognition and
awareness; it exemplifies the quality of its innerworkings. The resilience-oriented
communication focusing on the organizartion’s ability to ‘bounce-back’ during or after a crisis
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(Longstaff & Yang, 2008; Smith & Fischbacher, 2009). The resilience factor needs to be
centered around the process of adaptability versus an actual outcome (Olsson, 2014). Related,
community resilience builds trust as it is an essential component in creating effective crisis
information collaboration, network formation, and public engagement (Dekker, Jonse, Bergstrom,
& Dahlstrom, 2008; Hutton, 2012; Olsson, 2014).
Between the two intersections of the two dimensions discussed by Olsson (2014), the two
categories of operational and strategic communications on the resilience end are important to
note in relation to network creation. ‘Operational resilience-oriented’ category focuses on
providing emotional support and creating a collective identity, which ensures a strong sense of
responsibility among the crisis decision leader and team. This frame of mind helps to ease the
cognitive load on the tasked leadership decision crisis team, which can seep into the general
public (also known as external stakeholders) as well as a result once information is shared during
or after crisis internal processing. This creates and provides positive, direct accountability within
the organization that is associated or responsible for the critical incident stress phase of a crisis.
Crisis resolution can come as a proactive or reactionary approach, so in the face of
uncertainty, which is best becomes a pressing question (Lin et al., 2006). Literature agrees that
tightening corporate controls and policies is a tendency after the signaling of a crisis has been set
by internal or external stakeholders (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1988). Whether this is true for other
types of crises remains uncertain. The downside of tightened controls is that organizations can
lose agility, flexibility and dynamics and take managerial attention away from emerging
opportunities (Bogsnes, 2009). The literature argues that over time during a crisis, an
organization needs to loosen controls in order to maintain flexibility.
Crozier & Friedberg (1995) showed that the analysis of team decisions, which includes
crisis leader decisions are most often treated under the label of game theory (for multi-
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infrastructure crises). This simple (real options) decision theory, which could potentially work as
a mathematical quantitative basis for single independent crisis. From the standpoint of game
theory, most of the problems treated in decision theory are one-player games (or the one player is
viewed as playing against an impersonal background situation). In the emerging field of socio-
cognitive engineering, the research is focused on the different types of distributed decision-
making in organizations, in normal and abnormal/emergency/crisis situations. Overall, the field
of judgment and decision making has evolved to one with “numerous models that entail precise
formal descriptions of the cognitive mechanisms involved” (Marewski, 2018).
This is why what is obtained as knowledge learned during past crises have limited to no
value for improving future crisis management issues. A crisis requires a specific context and
special decision making. Some decisions such as crisis resolution creation decisions pertaining to
information sharing and communication in general between multiple groups across managerial
lines are difficult because of the need to take into account and somehow model how internal and
external stakeholders in the situation will respond to the decision that is taken. Real, accurate
options in terms of potential decisions to take would need to be modeled during or somehow
accounted for prior to a crisis.
Coombs (2006) uses a subject pool of undergraduate communication students who are
interviewed to see how crisis clusters would be grouped. That isn’t a relevant subject pool as that
is typically a group not knowledgeable on the topic of crisis clusters, management nor their
implications for internal or external stakeholders. Instead it is proposed that for crisis
management research to expand legitimately, a pool of organizational employees on various
managerial levels (crisis management decision leaders and executives) as well as operators
should be interviewed at companies that have experienced and have managed to come out the
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other side of a crisis in a positive manner (i.e., the organization did not shut down or going
bankrupt). This should especially be the case in the future when evaluating the internal
stakeholder crisis response time, delay factors, and solution strategies.
The limitations on crisis management communications research are that evaluations do not
happen in actual industry settings, are based on limited information, and don’t show personal
experiences or situational circumstances. The research is largely aimed at imaginary scenarios.
Since typically the main goal of studies are to figure out the relationship of the measured
constructs and not external validity, some mentioned limitations seem acceptable, but still need
to be explored in depth regardless.
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3 Results
Four results emerge from the literature regarding the critical stress incident stress phase
of an organization in crisis. Several questions are answered within this body of research.
One is the frequency in which project leaders take accountability during the critical
incident stress phase of a crisis. The hypothesis is that it is not often. As seen by the literature
review, organizations tend to take full responsibility only when attempting to resolve a novel
crisis if they are the at fault entity. The reaction time of organizations and decision leaders may
be slow as they attempt to mobilize and create an execution or resolution plan during a crisis.
Formulating a crisis leadership team that is tasked with creating and implementing solutions is
done first, followed by resolution creation and actions. All this transpires typically after the
critical incident stress phase of a crisis.
A more pertinent, second question is how frequently do project leader emotions get put
aside for speedy resolution during the crisis incident stress phase of a crisis? The hypothesis is
that it is often. According to the literature survey, altered emotional states, a crisis decision
leadership team will exhibit and become victim to attentional bias during the process of finding a
crisis response solution (response stage). If they manage to avert attentional bias, this is by
accepting personal control (while accepting and putting aside personal emotions) and assuming
full responsibility.
Third question is whether or not a relationship exists between the stress project decision
leaders face during a crisis and how fast they move towards project completion by swiftly
making a concrete crisis management plan? The hypothesis is that there is a statistically relevant
relationship. The crisis management leader or decision maker’s response will be delayed and
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fractured across managerial levels hierarchical and horizontally because the crisis management
team as a whole and on the individual contributor level will enter an altered state (anxiety, fear
frustration, anger), slowing down response and resolution time.
The last question that arises is, whether or not attentional bias is common for project
decision leaders during stages of crisis management from the critical incident stress phase to the
management phase? The hypothesis is that it is common. To avoid attentional bias and repair
crisis management communications, flexibility in engineering by way of real options decision
making and network structure adoption can serve as a suitable combination solution strategy.
Typically high intensity emotions surround the critical incident stress phase of a crisis and so
attentional bias ensues. Whether the crisis project decision leader assumes crisis responsibility
fully and quickly decides how quickly attentional bias or resolution takes place.
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4 The proposed Attention Crisis Communication Theory approach
The proposed Attention Crisis Communication Theory (ACCT) approach is an extending
decision and awareness level tree. Depending on the severity of a crisis, a myriad of emotions
and crisis responsibility acceptance levels or lack thereof can arise. From these variables a
certain level of personal control for the entity (decision leaders) in question arises from their
interplay. From there, emotions may arise that lead to resolution of the crisis or attention
deviation or tension can occur, which if gone unchecked leads to attentional bias during the crisis.
Real options filter into crisis severity level either aiding or weakening the crisis resolution
creation process.
The emotional energy surrounding a crisis leads decision leaders and stakeholders to
frustration (e.g., fear, anxiety, anger, resentment). This impedes cognitive processes, which in
turn creates psychological biases among which is attentional bias. Attentional bias is the
tendency to believe that there is a relationship between two or more variables when instances of
both are simultaneously observed, but otherwise ignore relationships with other variables even
though those may be relevant and important.
4.1 COVID-19 example
We use the COVID-19 crisis in the US Government as an example. The COVID-19 outbreak
created confusion and frustration at first between the Trump administration (federal
representatives) and state governments. It had to do with how early warning signs from federal
intelligence agencies (federal decision makers) were interpreted (accepted or disregarded). When
the first COVID-19 patients started showing up in Washington state. Federal and state decision
makers had to decide between stopping international travel from China or bringing back
international travelers that come for business, which could import the COVID-19 virus.
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Attentional bias arouse in the U.S. by Trump deciding to pre-maturely stop the air travel from
China compared to Western Europe governments. The attentional bias arose because China and
the U.S. were in an economic dispute, so Trump had to decide between minimizing COVID-19
spread and a negative economic impact. The inherent stress surrounding the crisis restricted
attention and created tension. This tension among government federal agencies (and Trump
administration) and state governments led to attentional bias. The resulting bias caused cognitive
rigidity (Holmes & Fletcher-Bergland, 1995) and an ineffective ability to deal with the crisis.
IRT and SCCT have been suggested as ways of thinking about attentional bias in crisis
situations like COVID-19 (see section 2). Different from IRT or SCCT, however, we propose an
audience-oriented (i.e., external stakeholders) theory, which focuses on stakeholder perceptions
of crisis situations, this is ACCT.
4.1.1 Pre-existing information
Coombs in arguing for SCCT says that information about past crises is a significant
factor that can affect perceptions of a current crisis. For example, Trump’s initial reaction to
COVID-19 in the US was affected by seeing results in Asian and European countries and
eventually deciding to make his own flights restriction policy with regards to stopping flights
from China (which slowed the business economy and COVID-19 initially). This reaction can be
related to emotional upheaval when the crisis is attributed to an organization or entity that
consists of decision leaders. They have to act quickly in times of crisis such as COVID-19..
Attentional bias may cause an environment of attention tension (e.g., state governments initial
fear of not having enough resources from federal sources (within the U.S. when the first state
COVID-19 cases started to arise and spread).
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Attentional bias arises during a crisis due to the urgency and desire to produce a solution
quickly by only thinking of relations among variables which have already been assumed. This
limits the opportunity for stakeholders to rely on trust-based relationships suggestive of other
correlations among factors (Moynihan, 2008). This is because the environment surrounding a
crisis is high speed, so decision leaders don’t always have time to link with or get advised by
trusted, preconceived, established relationships. Quick decision and action is of the essence.
According to Muller & Hillyard (2000), prior trust-based work relationships ease attention
tensions (i.e., Trump’s formation of new COVID-19 U.S. response team). However, in a crisis
prior trust-based work relationships are not always easily invoked as there may be external
stakeholders to be considered as well as internal stakeholders. This affects trusting relations
again because quick decision making is key during the critical incident stress phase of a crisis.
Coordination efforts may be difficult as anxiety and attention tension may surround the crisis
management team, but in time with relationships strengthened and with increased coordination,
attentional bias is lowered. An example would be daily press releases from COVID-19 decision
federal team tasked in the U.S. trumps quick action on creating the crisis response team
delegated what other federal agencies or he couldn’t do on his own as president. A quick federal
task team branching and delegating approach was critical during the onset of COVID-19 in the
U.S.
Attention tension and the resulting attentional bias may be alleviated over time as the
crisis management decision leader team regains control (e.g. establishing a COVID-19 crisis
response federal team). The blame assigned by external stakeholders (i.e., public, state
government bodies during COVID-19 outbreak) influences the response of the organization at
fault (i.e., Trump’s slow mobilization response), internal attention (i.e., federal government
during), and public relations (i.e., state governments and the public during).
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4.1.2 Crisis communication
The role of crisis communication in relation to project leader decision making is an
important factor that has yet to be explored in the difference in crisis handling among governing
bodies and the role of crisis communication in relation to decision making (i.e., how effectively
and efficiently Trump and the federal government handled the COVID-19 outbreak). It is
postulated that a majority of skills and traits combined would serve as a constructive solution to
the erratic response by project leaders during the initial stages of a crisis (i.e., initial response
during COVID-19 critical incident stress phase by Trump, federal, and state governments).
4.1.3 Decisiveness and analytical ability
Decisiveness and analytical ability are behaviors that may arise during a crisis to combat
attentional bias. A separate issue is self-confidence (i.e., Trump’s creation and mobilization of
crisis response teams). Self-confidence can be a deterrent or an aid in resolution creation by
provoking attentional bias or not. It is postulated from the literature that there will be a lack of
self-confidence in crisis decision leaders due to their fear, anxiety, and frustration. Crisis
situations are characteristically novel (i.e., COVID-19 outbreak), so they evoke strong,
sometimes negative emotions. Quick decisiveness, analytical ability, solution generation some
dampen or eliminate attentional bias.
It is presumed that pressure to respond to external stakeholders (e.g., the public) causes
attention tension, competing demands, and hence attention bias. Trust has to be established
among stakeholders both internally and externally, and across teams vertically and horizontally
to maintain an organization’s credibility. This, too, is a stress factor. It is important to note that
part of the solution to reducing attention tension and the cognitive attentional bias associated
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with it would be to create trust among parties within the organization (i.e., between federal
agencies, state governments, and the public during the COVID-19 crisis).
4.1.4 Debiasing attentional bias
By focusing on option-based decision making—specifically, “wait and see”—mixed with
reversible commitments, organizations can enhance strategic planning. By combining option-
based decision making with debiasing attentional bias, organizations can gain information at
each stage of dealing with, and solving a crisis. Specifically, by debiasing attentional bias (the
focus on multiple variables at once versus each one separately), flexibility in decision making
can be utilized and exploited (Bennet & Driouchi, 2012).
Debiasing is the act of reducing the effects of a bias with respect to decision making and
judgment or discernment. Debiasing or preventing attentional bias or even before that attention
tension by creating creative, decisive resolutions even among the calamity of the critical incident
stress phase of a crisis. A real-life example of this is the Trump administration taking the lead to
create and delegate the COVID-19 federal decision leader task force to handle or dampen the
spread of the virus within the U.S.
Flexibility in management theories are not discussed by Coombs. It is postulated that if
an organization maintains a flexible response to using existing financial and management
resources, that when a crisis does occur, a flexible and adaptable method can be implemented in
response (i.e., the Congressional stimulus package). In this case, attention tension and bias will
be less likely because the organization has proactively planned and prepared. Similar to what
Coombs postulates, a crisis portfolio would thus be created in advance.
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4.2 Limitations to the SCCT approach
What Coombs failed to discuss is how each crisis type relates to or is different from crisis
clusters (macro level). Cluster on a macro level meaning people or things occurring closely
together with regards to a crisis situation. It is important for leaders to preemptively prepare real
options for effective crisis management. Real options preparation in decision theory relating to
tangible assets for judgment. A decision can occur to defer or wait, act on, or ignore (abandon) a
crisis. This thinking pattern, discernment, and decisive actions taken would theoretically alleviate
attention tension, which in turn lower or eliminates attentional bias.
4.2.1 Use of social media
Coombs and Olsson argue that social media can be used by an at fault entity (e.g.,
government agency, organization, company) directly when notifying the public of a crisis instead
of relying on news media outlets to decide what information is worthy of publishing. A problem
with this work is that nothing is said about the emotional upheaval within the at fault entity of a
crisis (internal stakeholder emotional reaction) prior to the decision to distribute information to
the public. ACCT proposes to bridge this gap. If decision leaders decide to firmly own up to
crisis responsibility, in turn personal control is accepted and therefore attentional bias is lowered
or eliminated according to ACCT.
4.2.2 Crisis communication
The important transition is the need to shift crisis management literature from a ‘strategic
reputation-oriented’ communication approach to ‘strategic resilience oriented’ communication.
Meaning switch from strategic reputation protection focused communication to bouncing back
reputation wise internally for the at fault entity or head crisis decision leaders. In this manner an
at fault entity avoids attentional bias altogether and can recover from a crisis quickly/quicker.
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Traditional crisis communication issues need to be addressed in relation to repairing the
organization’s reputation with the community. The direction on ‘strategic resilience-oriented’
communication focuses instead on learned information and sharing after the critical incident
stress phase of a crisis.
It is argued that another dimension should be added to Olsson’s (2014) crisis
communication theory which is ‘internal strategic resilience’ communication. This form of
communication would focus on the internal stakeholder network and crisis solution creations.
This form of communication could be shared with the public and lower operator levels (i.e.
public news communications from the federal COVID-19 task team and state governors during
COVID-19). It would most likely sit at the intersection of the four dimensions discussed in
Olsson (2014) as a way to combine embracing learned and process improvement communication
during a crisis. It wouldn’t solely focus on how to repair the at fault entity’s reputation. By
adopting a network systems approach or decision trees and the ACCT model, an at fault entity
reputation can possibly be repaired and cognitive biases such as attentional bias can be avoided
by the crisis decision leaders. This is because the at fault entity would assume crisis
responsibility, so it would lead to positive crisis resolutions. Thereby mitigating or avoiding
attention tension and therefore attentional bias (ACCT model, figure A).
4.2.3 Uncertainty in crisis management
Uncertainty is inherent in the sources of the crisis communication problem, the evolution
of the problem, and its possible solutions. Coombs and Sherry (2002) identify eight crisis
strategies, which are attack on the accuser, denial, excuse, victimization, justification,
ingratiation, corrective action, or full apology. One precursor is missing, which is to synthesize
information to direct their attention internally. Crisis decision leadership should only go to one
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identified crisis response, which is corrective action (i.e. ACCT positive action flow through the
decision tree, see figure A). Crisis decision leaders should try to minimize the impact of the
critical incident stress phase by repairing the damage done by the crisis.
4.2.4 Protecting the organization’s reputation
Past research has focused primarily on organizational communication methods and how
they protect an organization’s reputation during a crisis. Internal stakeholders and the divided
attention of the participating parties is largely ignored. Coombs concludes that an organization
would take full responsibility internally for a crisis if it affected the public, but doesn’t speak to
the psychological and physiological effects on members within the organization (internal
stakeholders) to whom blame is assigned.
The speed and efficiency of crisis management methods is ignored. According to
Coombs (2002), “SCCT is composed of three core elements:
(1) the crisis situation,
(2) crisis response strategies, and
(3) a system for matching the crisis situation and crisis response strategies.”
Coombs forgets to include a primary step, which is the emotional and attention state of the
organization itself on each crisis project decision leader level, which leads to the identification
and characterization of the crisis situation and later crisis response strategies and network
systems.
4.2.5 Crisis coordination
Intersectional and interjurisdictional coordination arise as challenges in crisis
coordination even though that subject is not discussed within this paper. It should be researched
further by academics and industry professionals. Inter-jurisdictional has horizontal and vertical
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dimensions. Inter-sectoral proves to be a challenge because between sectors goals and priorities
as well as logic of operations may differ highly between organizations or project decision leaders.
Crisis resolution coming from a series of decisions or information sharing by various managerial
levels is a gap in literature discussion. Information across managerial lines and system
information sharing is discussed, but not individual decision making as it corresponds to
attentional bias and how that relates to organizational crises. Let’s not forget that a crisis also
demands an excess amount of emotional energy for its participating parties (internal
stakeholders). The role of emotions among internal stakeholders or decision leaders during a
crisis has been little researched.
The crisis management theory from a process perspective, touching on the portions of a
pre and post crisis sections provide organizations the opportunity for transformational growth if
meaning and purpose can be extracted. The overflow of information and supposed meaning lead
organizations to falter instead of taking direct action. It may explain the initial inaction by crisis
management leaders or managers across vertical hierarchical lines. Meaning is made through
cognitive, emotional and sociopolitical filters so that it can be understood and decoded by
internal stakeholders. These filters act as normalization processes. It brings back the crisis event
and its meaning. Putting the crisis into categories that are familiar and acceptable to the
organization’s internal stakeholders. A goal of crisis communication is for an audience whether it
be internal or external to the organization which is going through a crisis to believe in it, its
source, and credibility of the organization are important.
4.2.6 Trustworthiness and credibility in communication
Items such as trustworthiness and credibility come into play when judging a message
during crisis communication. This emphasizes the “importance of choosing the right project
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leader during in a crisis situation (Tkalac Vereie, A , V reie, D., & C o bs, 201 ).  Using a
credible project leader has an effect on crisis communication outcomes (Yang, Kang, & Johnson,
2010). Researchers have tried to establish the relationship between the level of credibility and
changes in beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors in audiences (Pornpitakpan, 2004), but they haven’t
focused on the emotional value and behaviors of the internal stakeholders during crisis
management processes and how that affects public or (external) shareholder response to a crisis
communication message.
4.2.7 Ambiguous responsibility
There are many crisis situations where crisis responsibility is ambiguous (Laufer,
Gillespie, & Silvera, 2009) and that may lead to ambiguity about internal stakeholder and crisis
team responsibility. A crisis leader apologizing to media and external stakeholders has found to
have a more profound effect on protecting an organization’s reputation during crisis as opposed
to a spokesperson speaking for the organization. No investigations have been made into internal
stakeholders and how more effectively can a crisis management team harness the power of all
managerial levels, both vertically and horizontally to create a crisis response strategy faster and
more efficiently. Tkalac, Vercic, & Coombs (2019) findings add to the body of knowledge in
crisis communication and show that both organizational reputation and speaker reputation are
influence the chosen response strategy. It may add anxiety to the crisis leaders if they are the
spokespersons.
On the other side, the current literature results do not show a source effect. Even though
an apology by a crisis decision leader leads to higher organizational reputation (in comparison
with an official spokesperson’s apology), the difference has not been proved as significant. The
same is true when it comes to speaker reputation. This potentially confirms previous findings
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that a crisis is perceived as a collective organizational problem instead of a crisis decision leader
or CEO responsibility. “It seems logical, as those studies concluded, that the CEO’s involvement
in crisis response gives [external] stakeholders a higher level of confidence and through this
reduces the damage and negative reactions” (Pauly & Hutchison, 2005). The CEO seems to be
“punished” more by the respondents for not taking accountability, but an industry case study or
pooling of multiple CEOs that have experienced infrastructure crises must be researched.
Within Van Wart & Kapucu (2011) research study, which does take away from industry
crisis management teams, the survey of the paper was carried out by only seventeen emergency
management officials in the even though fifty-one surveys were sent out, which is a saddening
response rate. Since the respondent rate was below thirty, the respondent rate is not a significant
statistical sample size at least in the eyes of classical statisticians. As well, it did not include
which levels of responsibility the officials were accountable for as an input factor to crisis
response strategy, but only the number of employee direct reports was noted. Granted since
emergency management is only loosely connected to crisis management (paper focused
primarily on natural disaster emergencies), only a speculative connection can be made. From the
limited response rate though, the average number of national disasters that the respondents
participated in was relatively high (3.8), so the findings were at least partially valid.
4.3 Structure of ACCT
Ocasio (1997, p. 189) defined project leader attention, as noticing, interpreting, and
focusing of time and effort by decision leaders “on both issues (the available repertoire of
categories for making sense of the environment- problems, opportunities, and threats) and
answers (the available repertoire of action alternatives, proposals, routines, projects, programs,
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and procedures).” The federal team mobilized by Trump to help resolve COVID-19 pandemic
attention illustrates how the concentration of attention is on the decision makers’ selectivity of
issues and is answered by an individual cognitive process (Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2017).
One postulates that competing demands between problems and solutions and the need to
find quick resolution induces attentional bias in the crisis management leader as well as in the
team. The organizational structure shapes the context of crisis management and resolution, for
example, the way resources were allocated between the federally tasked COVID-19 team and
state governments. The problem then goes from an individual (e.g., experts such as key engineers
who adapted ventilator equipment or scientists who worked on vaccine trials) to organizational
decision makers (e.g., federal technical team or scientists creating ventilators). Foresight and
strategic planning prior to the crisis are necessary to create a response network or system
(Bourmistrov & Kaarbøe, 2017).
Strategic planning was employed and tasks were delegated in a networked fashion during
the critical incident stress phase of the COVID-19 pandemic according to reputable sources and
articles. Engineers created ventilators, scientists worked on developing new vaccines, and federal
government were able to communicate a plan of action to state governments initially to a degree.
Whether the federal government mobilized a team quickly enough and delegated timely actions
to avoid attentional bias has yet to be known as the crisis is still ongoing.
The role of emotions and the change of constitutional or environment perception is
important. A crisis is not only characterized by high uncertainty but calls for a different type of
understanding to draw conclusions and is facilitated by a number of intense emotions (e.g. fear,
anger, anxiety, confusion, resentment, frustration) (Sayegh et al., 2004) according to SCCT and
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IRT theories. To comment on a decision leader’s (e.g. federal appointed COVID-19 task force or
team) or individual operator’s (e.g. local state expert engineers and doctors) mindset during a
crisis, it can be said that during non-crisis operation times, uncertainty runs typically of a normal
scale. This familiar zone of typical operations (non-crisis time periods) or familiar amount it can
be stated that the situation deals with “comfort zones.”. Meaning that if the work situation and a
person’s mindset are congruent with a work action, appropriate behavior will occur (i.e., federal
COVID-19 task team mobilizing state level doctors and engineers with resources to speed up
COVID-19 resolution and turn it from a national crisis and pandemic to a nonthreatening virus
that is cured through a ventilator or vaccine to sick individuals). On the other hand, if there is a
high intensity situation and it is characterized as the critical incident stress phase of a crisis (i.e.,
first 24 hours of COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S.), then a project leader or organization as a
whole will be forced to act in accordance with comfort (i.e., some of the first COVID-19 victims
still traveling to meet others; not following now established self-isolation or seeking immediate
medical help with new guidelines). Decision project leaders (or organization as a whole) will be
forced to generate new ideas and be innovative. The organization will be forced to move out of
comfort into creation, where the typical mindset and behavior have to change and adapt to the
new crisis situation (i.e., public in each state following federal government communicated social
distancing rules). This can either be positive in the generation of solutions or can be negative,
causing attentional bias if anxiety increases within the crisis management team further affecting
the organization experiencing the infrastructure crisis as a whole.
Attention crisis management theory (ACCT) focuses specifically on managing crisis
communications to address attentional bias and attention tension at the onset of the critical
incident stress phase. The flow of ACCT is gathered from, related to, and expanded upon from
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SCCT and IRT. According to SCCT and IRT the internal stakeholders have personal control
relating directly to crisis responsibility, but it can be argued that personal control has an arrow
going to and from in relation to emotional or psychological states and attentional bias (Figure
A).Those then relate to crisis responsibility. Also, the severity of a crisis may be an inlet or arrow
to personal control and crisis responsibility because the severity of the crisis may influence
subjective thoughts on personal control over the situation and emotions leading to deviations in
attention. Cognitive dissonance, confusion, or indecision due to the uncertainty surrounding the
crisis occur within organizations during the critical incident stress phase (i.e., the federal
government and tasked crisis force, state governments, and the public including seasoned, expert
engineers and scientists during the initial first three months of the COVID-19 crisis and outbreak
or pandemic within the all being confused on the best course of action to take to resolve the crisis
and pandemic). During a crisis some of the key resolutions are achieving organizational
restoration (initial operational capacity back) and learning (experience or knowledge gained from
navigating through a crisis successfully).
Instead of focusing on the situation and which stakeholders assign blame, the focus during crisis
characterization and management at first should at least be on engaging the crisis management
decision leadership team and delegating hierarchically effectively from an emotional standpoint
individually and focus on their attention direction and breadth, so as to downsize on or prevent
attentional bias and negative attempts to assign blame (i.e., federal government and state
governments working together to get rid of COVID-19 quickly and effectively by taking a
positive effort to mobilize and equip engineers and doctors across the to aid the public versus
political arguments between the federal and state governments with the U.S.). Efforts should be
focused on minimizing uncertainty among the initial chaos as much as possible thereby reducing
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crisis severity by evaluating real options on an organizational level and simultaneously loosening
communication channels (from a hierarchy of communication standpoint depending on
management and influence level) and attention during a crisis to speed up crisis resolution.
Figure 1. Attention Crisis Communication Theory (ACCT) Flowchart
Coombs (SCCT) makes excellent points that there are categories of crises and how they
can be addressed, but fails to take into account the psychological standing and emotions of the
stakeholders internally within an organization at the time of the crisis and its effects for the
duration of it. SCCT later remarks on reputation changes, which IRT puts into consideration, but
fails to consider the organizational impact. Emotion intensity and mental conceptual blocks tend
to dictate or surround a crisis. A crisis is characterized as a situation which has not occurred
before that’s negative and beyond the capabilities of the project decision leaders or internal
stakeholders solving it quickly without a huge influx of resources (i.e., federal and state
governments not realizing the severity of the COVID-19 crisis outbreak during the first month of
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the pandemic- the amount of masks and ventilators necessary for disbursement to various state
and military hospitals). The project decision leaders during the critical incident stress phase of a
crisis are typically pulled from their real options within the company or organization. There may
be an attention deviation or attentional bias backlash (state governments, engineers, and doctors
rallying by notifying the federal government that they need more resources- the attention
deviation between what’s more necessary- to get more ventilators to COVID-19 severe
symptomatic patients or protect themselves with more masks) as well when it comes to situation
crisis communication, which is why ACCT is proposed as an extension of SCCT and IRT.
Organizational psychology researchers are aware that individuals, whether it be top crisis
management decision leaders (i.e., federal government COVID-19 lead task team) or operators
(i.e., state engineers, scientists, doctors – local level crisis management teams) each tend to be
frozen or not act in time or sufficiently when in crisis at the beginning of the occurrence (i.e., the
as a whole not realizing COVID-19 was shaping up to become a pandemic). Emotions, thoughts,
and behavior are a mixed, sequential cycle. They feed off and into each other like a cyclic loop.
As an extension of the current research body, specifically the hypothesis of Coombs in 2002 and
2006, it is postulated that crisis responsibility and attention manner/degree/concentration
(division or synthesis along a spectrum) is central to ACCT internally for the organization. The
more deviated or separated attention is, the greater the complexity of the crisis, the more
negatively it impacts the organization in terms of reputation (i.e., the current federal government
workings for COVID-19 being under daily scrutiny by the public and media). The greater
amounts of attention bias and greater amounts of attention division and tension will occur,
regardless of crisis cluster/type.
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For ACCT crisis characterization, crisis theme will be assumed to be negligible in that
the cluster (victim, accidental, intentional) it can be assumed that the organization (federal
government during COVID-19) will act to solve the crisis (intentional only) and will either
willingly or forcefully have to respond to victims of the crisis or the public. By default the
organization will be utilizing their financial resources and decision leader emotional calm or
clarity to mitigate the crisis (e.g. federal COVID-19 task team holding daily news updates for
state governments and Trump signing off on and providing economic stimulus package
nationally). Second part of the crisis characterization is identifying the intensity of the crisis
notably evaluated by 1. Performance history of the organization (good or bad past organizational
dealings with internal versus external stakeholders i.e., federal government COVID-19 task team
past success record of its members), 2. Crisis past history (how effectively they dealt with a crisis
in the past) and 3. Severity of the current crisis situation (e.g. current status of COVID-19
pandemic in the eyes of Trump). As reputational threat increases, crisis management decision
leaders utilize strategies that indicate a greater acceptance of responsibility for the crisis and
simultaneously demonstrate concern for the public affected. Be that the internal organization
(i.e., COVID-19 federal task team) or in a national (state government COVID-19 task teams) or
international crisis external stakeholders (i.e., global public), as in the COVID-19 outbreak in
2019.
Attention (state of awareness or focus) deviation, attention tension, and emotional
influence are major variables in crisis management theories. ACCT is proposed as an expansion
of Coombs’s theoretical model (SCCT), which relates crisis internal control to organizational
reputation, but it also includes emotional and attention influences (Figure A). It can be
hypothesized that performance and crisis history of the organization will intensify crisis attention
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tension and attention deviation due to division. This may result in attentional bias because the
organization would have more data, but more uncertainty surrounding the crisis. An example of
attentional bias being, as the federal government received more notice on confirmed patients of
COVID-19 or data reports of either survived or dead, the federal COVID-19 crisis decision team
tried to make sure state governments were equipped with the right resources focusing on
communication instead of resource delivery possibly speedily to the states and hospitals with
regards to masks and ventilators).
The other factor that is proposed to include in the ACCT model is having real options
filter into crisis responsibility (Figure 1) as a factor that has the capability to influence decision
making that can aid in swift crisis management and solution generation. These options will have
a positive effect on organizational reputation overall in relation to crisis internal or external
stakeholders specifically because it will cut down on crisis uncertainty.
At the internal stakeholder, organization level, a real option is hypothesized to have a
positive correlation for solution creation, which stops at the personal control stage. It simply
helps avoid altogether attention tensions/division or attentional bias from arising during a crisis.
Real options enable corporations to manage their strategic options portfolios more optimally. It is
posed that a real options strategy portfolio would provide for efficient leader decision making.
Real options could eliminate internal attentional bias as the organization would have uncertainty
surrounding the crisis with one variable instead of multiple. It will give the organization more
time to solve the crisis and would allow for a flexibility in the decision-making approach.
Resources would be allocated more quickly than if a real options portfolio was not already in
existence. Real options is an instrument that allows for managing projects in an active and
forward-thinking manner.
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There are varying levels of crisis responsibility attribution. SCCT by Coombs and his
research states that reputational damage and intensifying factors during a crisis drive the
response methods. ACCT focuses primarily and expands on the theory of the severity of the
crisis, which Coombs largely ignores when outlining the presumptions behind SCCT, which can
be seen in his papers if 1999-2011 is analyzed (see references). Coombs postulates that crisis
responsibility is a function of crisis type and the severity of the damage. The researcher neglects
the internal collective organizational emotional damage and intensity (on the decision leader
combined with internal stakeholder level) and attention tension processing by the individuals at
fault, which are major influences during any crisis. ACCT model could be the key to unlock the
correlation or connections between internal and external crisis stakeholders and how they relate.
This theory not only touches on internal stakeholders (vertically and horizontal interplay within
the organization going through a crisis), but also external stakeholders and their views on the
crisis (e.g. public, shareholders, board members).
The convoluted process surrounding a crisis breeds internal tension on an individual level
in attempts to deflect blame and to rationalize behaviors. This contrasts with attempting to
analyze the critical incident and to extract positive lessons. Defining work role expectations
within the organization and accepting accountability helps alleviate the consequences of anxiety,
competition, and vigilance. ACCT is a simple and currently accurate speculation judging by how
systematically the globe is in crisis by the COVID-19 outbreak in China that spread and was not
initially contained.
4.4 Application of ACCT
Continuous active learning helps manage and reduce uncertainty and attentional bias
during a crisis. Forming network structures, for example, cyclic proliferating cycles, aids in the
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resolution of an organizational cross-boundary crisis. Network implementation leads to quicker
learning during a crisis by decision leaders effectively delegating tasks, which leads to the
creation of new procedures (e.g., SOPs). Learning prior to, during, and after the critical incident
stress phase of a crisis is what leads to flexibility and the capability to manage a catastrophe.
Learning leads to valid, verified information and timely action. Learning is ultimately a force for
positive change. Active learning is an implementation of new systems during a crisis.
Human cognitive processes are strained during a crisis. During a crisis, regular rationality
cannot be applied. This is because a novel, time sensitive crisis, which is high in uncertainty and
scope of information inhibits rationality. Cross-boundary crises are of particularly high impact
within an organization, government, or the public. Iterative trial and error processes, to
deciphering information and active learning may be risky and costly. This is why a network
systems learning approach may be best. Even if warning signs are received by organizations they
tend to be overlooked, can’t be addressed, or are minimized. Warning is assessed as unimportant.
Urgency during a crisis constrains and narrows decision leaders choices and attention causing
attention tension and eventually attentional bias.
Adopting a malleable system allows decision leaders to produce contingency plans and
allows flexibility in creating solutions. Another issue that decision leaders face is initially being
unaware of basic solutions that could feasibly work. This is why flexibility in engineering
approach such as real options can be applicable to avoid pitfalls such as attentional bias that arise
due to a lack or an overload of information. Active learning is expedited by the ability of crisis
decision leaders to establish equilibrium between action and an ambiguous, fluctuating, and even
volatile environment. This all relates to a networked system adoption suggestion (figure A).
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By creating a network system information can be cross checked and utilized better by the
decision leaders. The network system is best utilized through the use of adequate resources, error
discovery (trial and error troubleshooting of the system), and process improvement strategies that
are rewarded, and a strong adherence mission (entity values and vision). It must be noted that
when approaching a new crisis (during the critical incident stress phase), active learning from
past crises can negate current systematic learning because by definition each crisis is unique and
novel by character. Blind spots can be created and other cognitive biases similar to attentional
bias can occur (figure A example of ACCT system). Standard operating procedures (SOPs) can
serve as a reference, but shouldn’t be relied upon as a new crisis may not be similar to past ones.
Networks in well-known case studies are sometimes presented as an ideal type of crisis,
which is in the decentralized structural form meaning there is no network tree established, it’s
more random and chaotic. ACCT is different from hierarchical norms, which mostly occur
during regular operations. Some incidents of crises within the ACCT framework are a mixed
approach takes place between a decentralized and hierarchical network.
Dependencies management as the case study example of the exotic Newcastle disease
(END) outbreak in California that took place in 2002 in the U.S. spread to four other states.
Seven thousand individuals were employed during the critical incident stress phase of the crisis.
The case study provides an example of a massive multi-infrastructure coordination effort. The
case was surveyed by senior managers and 2,400 network participants. It was fairly successful
crisis management overall. As crises get more convoluted, as for the COVID-19 example, new
systems need to be regenerated from scratch as crises are always changing and evolving.
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Standard operating procedures (SOPs) creation is a common solution for network modes
of operation. SOPs move from uncertainty to crisis resolution and overall efficiency because
formal procedures are put in place for a process (it provides order and logic during a crisis which
sometimes isn’t present during the critical incident stress phase of a crisis). It is important to note
as a caveat, too many established procedures will reduce the flexibility in engineering approach.
This may still be key in a national (e.g. U.S.) or international cross-boundary crisis (i.e., COVID-
19 global pandemic). A mixed approach between hierarchical leadership and network
coordination (system creation) would be necessary to effectively and appropriately solve a crisis.
This type of approach would at least manage a crisis during or after the critical incident stress
phase of a crisis. Not one part of an organization has the capacity to organize an effective
response.
The structure of a network during a cross-boundary crisis depends on the degree of tasks
faced and the individuals involved. Both subjects are related to the operational challenges and
communication flows. A crisis is categorized as three types of network uncertainty. Substantive
uncertainty, deals with the lack of knowledge about the problem or overload of non-definitive
information. Strategic uncertainty, arises since multiple key players retain varying degrees of
strategic autonomy, creating uncertainty about what choices they will make. Much of the
strategic uncertainty that networks face after the critical incident stress phase of a crisis arises
from their relatively loose structural form. Networks that are more established are likely to
perform better as a crisis management plan begins and continues to form the crisis leaders’
decision-making. Institutional uncertainty arises from trying to coordinate individuals who have
their own perceptions, norms, and objectives. People who come from different functional
backgrounds, administrative levels, or cultures. If a crisis situation is not paid attention to it can
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lead to fear, which can lead to attentional bias if the crisis management process is not approached
optimally.
In a hierarchical network system where a key crisis decision project leader is assigned,
key crisis management subjects such as operations and finance are essential. If a critical incident
stress phase becomes too large and disperse geographically, then other subordinate crisis
decision leaders are assigned (i.e. COVID-19). There is always a conflict resolution network that
is delegated and created by the at fault entity (despite having also a hierarchical top down
component). In time, attentional bias will be reduced. Due to the established network structure,
the ability to transfer pertinent information will occur more efficiently because to do tasks and
action plans can occur at greater speeds.
The adoption of a layered network helps to reduce strategic uncertainty during a crisis.
Individual stakeholder autonomy is reduced. A more centralized management network is
focused on. Increasing collaboration seen as a success factor. Since uncertainty was lowered
with this management system, it can be concluded that attentional bias would be reduced or
averted. Key stakeholders would be aware of the members of the new network (or systems of
operation). This establishment of an incident command system doesn’t necessarily constrict the
flexibility in engineering approach for crisis management. The system offers a line of ultimate
responsibility and common organizational vocabulary. The resultant or typical degree of
attention tension and therefore attentional bias should be lowered.
An incident command system may possess its own pitfalls. During crisis resolution
creation- at the lowest level of operators, they need to be allowed to take direct action on their
own (without being advised by a head incident crisis decision leader). The system may increase
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the reaction crisis management time overall for the internal stakeholder team collective. This
may reflect poorly on the external stakeholders. Overall, ongoing process learning, information
sharing, and collaboration may be stifled. Instead, these factors should be aided by the adoption
of a hierarchical system versus more of a flat, network systems approach to the problem. The
ICS model needs to have the ability to be adapted to the needs of a crisis. This pertains to both
structure and level of discretion given to resolution creation teams executing tasks.
Just like any hierarchical organization, some regional line managers involved in the crisis
management process may become territorial. This pertains to information sharing, which may
cause nearsightedness for the resolution process. This structure may also cause a lack of
delegation between siloed crisis management groups, which can reduce overall creativity and
resolution time (i.e., state governments during COVID-19 crisis outbreak). With the need of
dynamic movement for resolution creation, having an ICS can increase resolution time. Vertical
chain of management will need to transpire on top of horizontal management between teams.
One caveat- if the crisis decision leader is tasked with this great responsibility, even seasoned
leaders may initially feel confused or panic during the process because the crisis would be unlike
any other faced. Uncertainty will surround the entire decision crisis management team and the
resolution task. All of this further showing the need for a mixed network creation approach. One
positive aspect of adopting an ICS in a large crisis is that it spans across multiple organizations.
There is high turnover in the overall network of crisis management stakeholders (i.e., between
federal and state agencies during COVID-19 outbreak). This structure could serve as a base for
individuals to turn to for reference or questions during the resolution process.
There is active learning through network systems implementation that must take place during
crisis resolution creation. Implementing systems will reduce uncertainty, overall internal and
50
external stakeholder anxiety, and hence attentional bias (i.e., news current daily reports on
COVID-19 testing statuses and data collection). Standard operating procedures (SOPs) reduce
uncertainty while in a crisis. Helping to shape cognitive behaviors of internal stakeholders by
creating and recording common routines during the process. This type of learning encapsulates a
cybernetic approach (a multidisciplinary approach for exploring regulatory systems) by
simplifying decision making burdens in a convoluted environment. It is important to note that
SOPs will most likely need to be rewritten once established because a crisis duration is a
dynamic, changing, and occasionally an unpredictable process. Online discussions as well as
virtual learning are manners in which to exchange information throughout the network, which
can also lead to SOP generation. This ensures clarity, standardization, and consistency in new
system operations as the network grows and develops during crisis.
At the center of the subject is that there is an issue between the way decisions circulate
and the manner in which information flows. Within crisis management communication between
parties involved in decision making and communication lines there lies a discrepancy. It’s why
hierarchical traditional top-down crisis management communication cannot work. A layered
network approach would be more useful. The scale of the crisis and variables involved can be
interpreted at different resolutions; the nuance differences can actually be observed. A piece of
information can suffer if decision leaders are not specific in their communication topics (an
amount of distortion can occur). During a crisis, one piece of information is received differently
by the internal stakeholders (partial transmission, distortion, etc.). Every internal stakeholder
interprets it differently based on his/her perception of reality and may act differently.
In attempt to reduce ambiguity and uncertainty during crisis resolution creation,
flexibility in design is needed. It maximizes the efficiency of a system over time. Flexibility in
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design allows the crisis decision leader and team to be most effective when they work together-
to integrate planning, design, and management activities from beginning to resolution. Creating
best value during a long-lasting crisis requires a sustained team effort (from the central decision
leader and across the established network team). Success involves more than applying special
techniques; it entails a way of thinking about systems and implementing them. Flexibility is
fundamental to systems design.
In an organizational systemic context, real options in decision-making surround an
entity’s ability to sequence, stage, and or reverse commitment in the face of uncertainty. It allows
for flexibility in its operations and inner-workings of an independent entity. Sequentially
observing and implementing decisions allows room for crisis decision leaders to assess the
benefits or partly reverse commitments if necessary. This method would allow more room for
debiasing attentional bias.
Acquiring the necessary knowledge for adapting to uncertainty, a responsible entity can
develop systems and practices (e.g. procedures) to benefit from the variance of operations and
explore new opportunities. The crisis decision leaders enter an evolution lifecycle where
knowledge is a core competence, and learning becomes a competitive advantage. Empirical
research and simulations solve issues of timing and real options creation. The uncertainty-
flexibility systematic relationship optimizes over the time scale.
The key challenges in creating a productive attention scale distribution are focus
differentiation and integration (aligning with decision leader values). Attentional bias can be
avoided if a decision leader as a whole looks at variables sequentially (critical pieces of
information). That is, one variable at a time and evaluates them independently. Therefore,
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movement toward crisis resolution will move in a positive and quicker direction. This method is
quicker than if attentional bias happens where two pieces of information are seen at the same
time as correlating with one another. This must be confirmed quantitatively with further research.
Information sharing is key, but literature has yet to decide how much is too little or too much
information sharing during a cross-boundary crisis. Game theory would be most applicable for
testing. By establishing real options and seeing in which directions attention (focus) is going, an
a decision leader and team could avoid a crisis or at least minimize its impact.
The classical model for decision making follows a normal Gaussian distribution, and is
therefore blind to extreme crisis events. The idea of networks and its approach with non-
changing variables are what doesn’t change in a system (in this the critical incident stress phase
of a crisis) can be seen as another angle for crisis resolution creation. This approach helps to
identify which variables are part of the problem (changing variables) and which are part of the
solution. In this manner, different types of crises could be compared to see which independent
variables are consistent across fields to bring crisis management closer to emergency
management. As in the financial industry, how invariants help with understanding volatility, the
same can be applied to crises for example. A number of variances surface when crises are
analyzed.
Notably, the domino effect post the critical incident stress phase of a crisis occurs.
Localized, relatively small events can proliferate into multistate, national, or international crises
in a matter of hours/weeks (e.g. COVID-19 international pandemic outbreak). A lack of spatial
containment during and after the crisis event is prevalent. The magnifier effect on a time scale
increases exponentially as well. For financial crises, stock markets crashing in a few milli-
seconds to infrastructures such as dams collapsing and causing widespread damage in a record
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number of hours as could be seen by the effects of hurricane Katrina. Later causing pervasive
crises in the surrounding states as a massive number of humans are displaced from their homes
and needing to find new ones. This all relates to the aggregation effect in terms of how
individuals and their movement are related in a crisis situation.
The sense making invariance also proceeds as the initial crisis management team and
individuals affected by the crisis attempt to wrap their heads around the crisis trigger event. The
crisis decision leaders and team usually cannot as the event is outside the realm of normal
operational functioning. This can be seen for the COVID-19 crisis, which spread from China
globally across to countries such as America. Even though information was available from other
countries (such as those in Europe), it still took the time and networked attention between the
federal and state government to really grapple with the COVID-19 pandemic crisis and finally
contain it. All included decision leader teams failed to grasp the severity and magnitude of the
event initially. The COVID-19 pandemic caused attention tension and division. Therefore,
attentional bias was caused during the onset of the pandemic crisis. A networked approach to
sequentially focus on the crisis at hand will slowly, but surely control and weaken a crisis.
The majority of literature reviewed agree that a centralized and top-down approach to
crisis management is typically ineffective as too many variables become intertwined during the
onset of the critical incident stress phase of a crisis. The problem during crisis communication is
that messages become distorted and reinterpreted according to competing interests and demands
across the crisis decision leader managerial lines. Distortion becomes a central issue along with
ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding a crisis. All cause emotional strain for the crisis decision
leader team and other key individuals (internal and external stakeholders) effected by the crisis.
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This is why a combined approach of network systems with a real options decision-making
strategy are recommended as a solution within the realm of single entity crisis.
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5 Conclusions
The foregoing discussions suggest the following conclusions on dealing with attentional
bias in crisis management.
1) Creativity. The literature suggests that the creativity of decision leaders needs to be
stimulated to develop broad options during crisis operations. Hypothetical games could
be used as a future experiment with experienced crisis leaders in industry (public or
private) or from government or military agencies better to understand and manage the
direction of attention during crisis situations. Scenario exercises may help to reduce the
effects of attentional bias and the associated overconfidence in the belief that a set of
options is comprehensive. Creativity is important in any group dynamic to encourage
ideas and action so as to prevent attentional bias. Creativity allows decision leaders to
focus on solutions to a pressing problem. If a decision leader provides a safe, open
environment where internal and external stakeholders can provide feedback and ideas, a
crisis situation can be solved more promptly.
2) Resilience-oriented and operational communication. As Olsson (2014) stated, “by
emphasizing more resilience-oriented and operational communication in times of crisis,
the focus moves away from strategic messages to dealing with issues related to how crisis
decision leaders cope with issues related to control, transparency, speed and tone.” In turn
resilience-oriented and operational communication eases internal, initial emotional
upheavals during crisis management, making the crisis decision leadership more effective.
The team is able to find swift, creative solutions. These may reduce negative effects of
attentional bias by focusing on one variable at a time. If emotions and level of personal
control are fully acknowledged, straight forward, speedy, creative solutions are more
likely to flourish. By communicating authentically about their emotions within the high
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pressure and challenging onset of the critical incident stress phase, decision leaders can
move toward creating solutions or taking action. Resilience-oriented communication
means the project decision leader and team are able effectively to move through
unpleasant feelings, still communicate effectively, have greater levels of self-awareness,
and can communicate that self-awareness as needed.
3) Real options and networks. Concrete solutions by way of the project decision leader
taking responsibility and leading with resolve are a positive way to lead during the
critical incident stress phase of a crisis. However, if resolutions can’t be made quickly
(within 24 hours), the project decision leader should delegate tasks to his/her appointed
decision leader team and hence taking a networked approach. Establishing real options
alongside a network during a crisis ensures that decision leaders in combination with
other internal and or external stakeholders can more effectively improve cross
institutional coordination. The cross coordination occurring because through network
establishment resolution and creativity are more easily attained since the environment for
them is created. Delegating and splitting up tasks to a main decision leader team or
external stakeholders increases solution creation speed during the critical incident stress
phase of a crisis. Decision leaders and stakeholders (internal and or external) have a
shared, vested interest to expedite resolving a crisis.
4) Apologies. Apologies produce more positive effects than sympathy when dealing with
the public (external stakeholders) and trying to positively impact organizational
reputation (Coombs and Sherry, 2002), but there has been no research to see how apology
or sympathy play a role within a crisis management team and how they deal affect
internal stakeholders across managerial lines. It is clear theoretically that if ACCT is
adopted by a crisis decision leader and or team that there are certain crisis management
57
competencies that the crisis decision team must possess in order to positively influence
internal and external stakeholders and move the crisis from the initial shock of the trigger
event to swift resolution. A combination of direct communication and strategic decision
making by way of dispersing crisis management layered networks and real options
analysis prior to and during a crisis help to ease the attention tension and attentional bias
for an organization during a crisis and move it to speedier solutions (figure A). When a
decision leader takes a stance of apology instead of defensiveness or assigning blame, it
comes from an authentic state of intention and is therefore more believable. An apology
makes the decision leader seem receptive to internal and external stakeholder feedback. It
shows that the decision leader is willing to proceed from the critical incident stress phase
of the crisis to resolution. It exhibits authenticity from the main decision leader and
ensures the stance that the wrongful behavior won’t be repeated. When a decision leader
apologizes, often the entity (e.g. organization, company) survives a crisis (U.S. COVID-
19 example of its eventual control and slowing down of).
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6 Further Research
The present review and recommendations suggest several topics of future research.
How organizations weaken over time and dissolve could be researched in the future.
The art of decision making and extracting pertinent data or information remains the central topic
for crisis processing and resolution creation. Bayesian theory may be best applicable for crisis
management quantitative analysis as less statistical samples are necessary to extract valid
information to produce solutions and most corporations aren’t keen on accepting crisis blame as
seen in the above literature survey.
Personal commitments. Shrivastava selected a set of personal commitments (on the
side of the researcher), which he thought were key to making contributions to crisis research
overall. These are: integrity, courage, creativity, patience, and perseverance, which can be
explored in depth in terms of subjective influences leading to cognitive biases on analyzing crisis
management communication theory.
Communication lines and degree of discussion. It is agreed with Olsson (2014) that
organizations that have a more centralized, top-down structure for internal communication to
internal and external stakeholders are more engaged in reputational aspects of communication
internally and with the public. Decision leaders that can adopt a decentralized, open discussion,
and networks approach can take on a more resilience-oriented approach to crisis communication
both internally and externally. It may be more appropriate for the future operations during crisis
management as it incorporates a flexibility in engineering approach which is more adept in
handling and minimizing uncertainties during a crisis. The flexibility in engineering and
networks approach would ideally be aimed at reducing internal attention tension and attentional
bias. Teamwork and collaboration would be focused on inducing creativity instead of competing
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interests. A traditional hierarchical approach would not create unnecessary red tape during a
crisis.
Standard operating procedures. During a crisis the important resolutions are gaining
organizational restoration (initial operational capacity back) and learning (experience or
knowledge gained from navigating through a crisis successfully). The crisis management process
transitions from the critical incident stress phase to organizational restoration and learning phases
as concluding cyclic phases. It will be beneficial for the crisis management decision leader or
group to create a structure by way of standard operating procedures (SOPs) and reporting. This
way learning and growth can transpire, ensuring that the same type of crisis will not occur in the
future. Future research on how SOP creation and system operations intertwine during crisis
communication management could be another potential avenue for future research.
‘Emergency’ and ‘crisis management’. The prior focuses on traditional, open, public
service emergency management and the latter on organizations’ reputation which stems from
business and marketing (Frandsen & Johansen, 2009). Too much emphasis on market analysis
and organizational preservation is counter effective in crisis communication. It would only breed
more internal attention tension hence resulting in attentional bias, which is the opposite of what
would be desired during crisis management and would be ineffective as a strategy overall. It
could be seen in the TeleCo. case study example of how a top down hierarchical structure bred
confusion across managerial lines instead of fostering collaboration. The developing COVID-19
crisis in the and internationally is also an example. COVID-19 slow action towards resolution
and confusion between federal and state governments is also huge. It is presumed that these types
of results would be seen in other organizations during a crisis event if handled inappropriately,
but further research must be conducted.
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If conceptually crisis management communication scholars expand the definition and
implications of crisis research, then opportunity, learning, and networks can be discussed in
addition to blame or bias reducing strategies. Even the breadth of induced biases have not been
discussed in great detail, which is why this paper chose to focus on attentional bias specifically
resulting from the critical incident stress phase of a crisis and its potential implications. Methods
on how to facilitate not only information sharing, but crisis leadership team or organizational
trust between various line managers, operators, and departments can help ease the transition from
crisis conception to resolution creation in literature. This frame of thinking and decision making
away from anxiety and induced biases would instead breed resilience in the crisis management
team within an organization and the community at large when a larger scale crisis takes place
(i.e., international COVID-19). It would ultimately provide an opportunity for growth in the
literature and apply directly to industry.
Game theory. Other topics that should be explored are decision theory interactions with
game theory as a proposed solution or necessary analysis for the proposed ATTC model. In
addition, decision and organizational psychology as applications for ATTC could also be a
fascinating exploratory study. Socio-cognitive research is human factor and socio-organizational
factor based. Socio-cognitive research assumes an integrated knowledge engineering,
environment and business modeling perspective, therefore, it is not social cognition, but rather is
a branch of psychology focused on how people process social information. Bandura's (2000)
social learning theory stresses the importance of observational learning, imitation and modeling.
His theory integrates a continuous interaction between behaviors, personal factors - including
cognition - and the environment referred to as the reciprocal causation model.
Perceived collective efficacy. Evidence from diverse lines of research attests to the
impact of perceived collective efficacy on group functioning during crises. The findings taken
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show that the stronger the perceived collective efficacy, “the higher the groups (crisis decision
leader) aspirations and motivational investment in their undertakings, the stronger their staying
power in the face of impediments and setbacks, the higher their morale and resilience to stressors,
and the greater their performance accomplishments” (Bandura 2000). The findings taken as a
whole show that the stronger the perceived collective efficacy, the higher the crisis decision
leader(s) aspirations and motivational investment in their undertakings. The stronger their
staying power in the face of impediments and setbacks, the higher their morale and resilience to
stressors, and the greater their performance accomplishments (Bandura, 2001). ACCT and the
relation to the socio-cognitive theory could be an interesting organizational psychology
exploration.
Ludic fallacy. A general criticism of decision theory based on a fixed universe of
possibilities is that it considers “known unknowns” but not “unknown unknowns.” Decision
theory focuses on expected variations, not on unforeseen events, which some argue have a large
impact and must be considered. This line of argument, called the ludic fallacy, states that there
are inevitable imperfections in modeling the real world by particular models, and that
unquestioning reliance on models blinds one to their limits. Researchers are fallible, despite
attempts to put theories and mathematics behind their words. Unforeseen events or loopholes in
logic or experience should be explored and observed during a crisis. Overall though the point to
consider is this is only due diligence done in retrospect to learn from a crisis.
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